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NOTES
general. If courts continue to assume that the advertisement is
an offer without closely analyzing the individual case, advertisers
will be forced to publish the complete terms of any possible con-
tract which might result from the advertisement. It is submitted
that such a result would be an unreasonable burden. The public
understands that advertisements are deliberately terse to give
the reader a general idea of what is available without having
to state the details of a possible contract. The presumption
against advertisements as offers 2 must be maintained in order
to promote the most efficient communication between the ad-
vertiser and the public.
A. J. Gray, III
SALES-BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE-CREDIT ON
PRE-EXISTING DEBT
Plaintiff-consignor shipped gear equipment to consignee for
sale on plaintiff's account. Consignee transferred part of the
equipment to defendant in what appeared to be a C.O.D. sale
for $1800. Actually, consignee had an unpaid account with
defendant, who credited this account with the value of the equip-
ment, thus cancelling the account. After defendant had sold
the equipment in a subsequent transaction, plaintiff brought
suit to recover the equipment or its value. The trial court
held that the pre-existing debt constituted valuable considera-
tion and that defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. On certiorari,
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. Held, a person who
takes property in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt has not
given valuable consideration and therefore cannot be a bona
fide purchaser for value. Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Epstein,
246 La. 953, 169 So. 2d 61 (1964).
It has generally been held in Louisiana and at common law
that a bona fide purchaser for value is one who parts with new
consideration at the time of his purchase and does not have
prior notice of any adverse interest sought to be enforced against
the property acquired.1 Although there is no uniform pronounce-
27. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
1. Port Fin. Co. v. Ber, 45 So.2d 404, 406 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950), wherein
the court stated: "Louisiana has received the common law concept of bona
fide purchaser into its jurisprudence." Quoting from Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 420,
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ment as to what constitutes value, several attempts have been
made to define this term.2  As to whether credit on a pre-exist-
ing debt constitutes value sufficient to make a third party a
bona fide purchaser for value, not only are the common law
jurisdictions in conflict, but the question appears to be res nova
in Louisiana.
The most pertinent provision of the Louisiana Civil Code
is article 2138, which provides that if a debtor undertakes to
discharge his obligation by giving in payment a thing he has no
right to deliver, the true owner may reclaim it from the creditor,
unless the thing given has been consumed in use.3  The only
relevant Louisiana case is Frantz v. Fink, where a consignee
attempted indirectly to give in payment certain earrings belong-
ing to the plaintiff.4  In allowing recovery of the earrings from
421 (1949), the court explained this concept as follows: " 'The common law rule
that a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice prevails over the original
seller has its origin in equity and is based on the theory that the legal right of
the third party cuts off the equity of the original seller. . . . It is essential that
the third party have no notice of the defective title.' " It should be noted that
the court omitted a portion of the quotation from the Note and that this omission
contains a necessary element of the entire bona fide purchaser rule, which is:
"A third party who acquires property without payment of value is not entitled
to protection as a bona fide purchaser." For a precise enumeration of the ele-
ments of a 'bona fide purchaser in relation to sales, see Barthelmess v. Cavalier,
2 Cal. App. 2d 477, 488, 38 P.2d 484, 490 (1934) : "The elements of bona fides
in the law of sales are: (1) a valuable consideration; (2) the absence of notice;
and (3) the presence of good faith."
2. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 76: "Value is any consideration sufficient to sup-
port a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing claim, whether for money
or not, constitutes value where goods or documents of title are taken either in
satisfaction thereof or as security therefor."
See also BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 25 (7th ed. 1948)
"Value is any consideration to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-
existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is
payable on demand or at a future time." Compare the above with UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (44) : "Except as otherwise provided with respect to
negotiable instruments and bank collections . . . a person gives 'value' for rights
if he acquires them . . . (b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of
a pre-existing claim." But see id. § 1-201(9) where it is stated that a "buyer in
the ordinary course of business" does not include one who takes goods in bulk
or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2138 (1870) : "If the debtor give a thing in payment
of his obligation, which he has no right to deliver, it does not discharge his obliga-
tion, and the owner of the thing given may reclaim it in the hands of the creditor,
unless the obligation has been discharged by the payment of money, or the delivery
of some of those things which are consumed in the use, and the creditor has
used them; in which case neither the money nor the things consumed can be
reclaimed, and the payment will be good."
4. William Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 125 La. 1013, 52 So. 131 (1910). Consignee
attempted to give in payment earrings belonging to plaintiff in exchange for
defendant cancelling his claim against the consignee for a certain diamond brooch
he had made for defendant but which consignee had pledged to a pawnbroker.
Consignee pledged the earrings to another pawnbroker and defendant was to
acquire his brooch and earrings by redeeming consignee's pledges with the pawn-
brokers. Plaintiff was allowed to recover these earrings from the defendant.
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the defendant-creditor the court apparently based its decision
on the fact that the defendant had prior knowledge of the
consignee's misdealings rather than on the ground that the de-
fendant had not parted with value." In the same case, the de-
fendant had purchased another set of earrings from the consignee
and was held to be a bona fide purchaser against the plaintiff,
the court reasoning the defendant had parted with value and
the consignee had the necessary indicia of ownership6 to trans-
fer a valid title.
A majority of common law jurisdictions hold that the giving
of credit on a pre-existing debt in exchange for chattels does
not constitute value sufficient to place the creditor in the posi-
tion of a bona fide purchaser against the true owner seeking
to reclaim his goods.7  On the other hand, some jurisdictions
have held the creditor to be a bona fide purchaser for value even
though the only consideration given was credit on a pre-existing
indebtedness." However, it should be noted that if payment was
It may be noted that this was not a true dation en paiement, but an indirect one,
as the defendant used the pawnbroker's ticket to acquire the earrings.
5. Id. at 1034, 52 So. at 139: "We put our decision distinctly on the fact
that the earrings were not acquired from a merchant having them for sale to
the public generally, but were redeemed from a pawnbroker's shop at the request
of an embezzler as a means of settlement for the embezzlement."
6. Id. at 1031, 52 So. at 138: "It is a plain proposition that the mere posses-
sion of movable property is not such indicium of ownership as will enable the
possessor to convey a good title as against the true owner. He [the owner]
must have to some extent accredited the title of the possessor--clothed him with
more pronounced indicium of ownership than mere possession.
"This may be done in various ways, and one way would be . . . consent that
a vendor of jewelry exhibit the jewels as part of his stock of goods, or as belonging
to him." In Frantz the court found the "more than mere possession" to be the
fact that both plaintiff and defendant dealt with Moss knowing him to be a trader
in the same business, which seems to be the reasoning of the trial court in the
instant case. However, in both cases the only visible indicium of ownership was
mere possession. For a stricter requirement concerning indicia of ownership see
Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So. 2d 477 (1957), where the plaintiff was
attempting to regain possession of a car because the check given him by his vendee
was worthless. Recovery was denied as plaintiff had parted not only with pos-
session of the car, but application for title, license papers, and an invoice bill of
sale.
7. See Western Land & Cattle Co. v. Plumb, 27 Fed. 598 (N.D. 11. 1886)
Hamilton v. Rankin, 108 Ark. 552, 158 S.W. 496 (1913) ; Truxton v. Fait &
Slagle Co., 17 Del. 483, 42 At. 431 (1889) ; P. Cox Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Adams,
105 Iowa 402, 75 N.W. 316 (1.898) ; Henderson v. Gibbs, 39 Kan. 679, 18 Pac.
926 (1888); Hard v. Bickford, 85 Me. 217, 27 Atl. 107 (1892); Buffington v.
Gerrish, 15 Mass. 156 (1818); Automobile Equipment Co. v. Motors Bankers'
Corp., 251 Mich. 220, 231 N.W. 559 (1930); Sleeper v. Davis, 64 N.H. 59, 6
AtI. 201 (1886); Wheeling & L.E. R.R. v. Koontz, 61 Ohio St. 551, 56 N.E.
471 (1900) ; Phelps, Dodge & Palmer v. Halsell, 11 Okla. 1, 65 Pac. 340 (1901)
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Lyons, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 633, 25 S.W. 805 (1894)
Downs v. Belden, 46 Vt. 674 (1874).
8. See Wight v. Chandler, 264 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Virginia Timber
& Lumber Co. v. Glenwood Lumber Co., 5 Cal. App. 256, 90 Pac. 48 (1907);
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made partly by the crediting of an antecedent debt and partly
by the payment of cash, this generally has been held to be a
purchase for value for the full amount. Although the Uniform
Commercial Code provides that any entrusting of goods to a
merchant dealing in goods of that kind gives him power to
transfer all rights to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, 0
another provision of the Uniform Commercial Code states that
one receiving goods in total or partial satisfaction of a money
debt is not a buyer in the ordinary course of business." There-
fore, the majority view at common law has apparently been
adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code.
The French deal with the bona fide purchaser for value un-
der the doctrine en fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre-
in the matter of movables, possession is equivalent to title. 12 This
doctrine does not apply if the goods are lost or stolen 13 or if the
third party acquiring them has knowledge 14 that his transferor
is not the true owner or is not capable of alienating them.
French Civil Code article 123815 provides that a dation en paie-
ment is not valid unless the person giving the thing in payment
is the owner and is capable of alienating it. According to the
French commentators, 16 the doctrine of la possession vaut titre
Hallet v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 114 Pac. 490 (1911) Sutton v. Ford, 114 Ga.
587, 87 S.E. 799 (1916) ; Butters v. Haughwout, 42 Ill. 18 (1866); Strauss,
Pritz & Co. v. S. Hirsh & Co., 63 Mo. App. 95 (1895) Rasmussen v. 0. E. Lee
& Co., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P.2d 119 (1937).
9. See Wilk v. Key, Simmons & Co., 117 Ala. 285, 23 So. 6 (1897) ; Titcomb
v. Wood, 38 Me. 561 (1854) ; Kingsbury v. Smith, 13 N.H. 109 (1842) ; Wears
& Googher Dry-Good Co. v. Crews, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 667, 57 S.W. 73 (1900).
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403(2) : "Any entrusting of possession
of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to trans-
fer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of business."
11. See id. § 1-201(9).
12. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2279 (Cachard's transl. 1930): "Possession is
equivalent to a title with respect to personal property. Nevertheless a person
who has lost a thing, or from whom it has been stolen, can claim it from the
person in whose hands he finds it, during three years from the day of the loss
or of the theft; but the latter has his remedy against the individual from whom
he has received it."
13. Ibid.
14. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT, ET DE LA MORANDIhRE, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL
n* 1545 (10th ed. 1953).
15. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1238 (Cachard's transl. 1930) : "In order that
a payment should be valid one must be the owner of the thing given in payment
and be capable of conveying it.
"Nevertheless, the payment of a sum of money or of some other thing which
is consumed by use, cannot be recovered from the creditor who has consumed it
in good faith, although the payment has been made by a person who was not
the owner or who was not capable of conveying it."
16. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT, ET DE LA MORANDItRE, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL
na 1545 (10th ed. 1953) ; BAUDRY-LACANTINERE ET BARDE, TRAITt DES OBLIGA-
TIONS n 1424 (1905).
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and not article 1238 controls where a good faith creditor ac-
cepts goods by way of a dation en paiement; thus the true owner
is generally denied recovery of his goods.
The instant case demands a determination of whether credit
on a pre-existing debt constitutes value sufficient to make a
third party a bona fide purchaser for value. However, there
is the underlying policy determination of which of two innocent
parties, plaintiff-owner or defendant-creditor, should be protect-
ed against the loss resulting from the unauthorized act of the
consignee. In holding the defendant to be a bona fide purchaser
for value the trial court took note of four factors: the plaintiff
entrusted the equipment to a consignee engaged in the business
of selling this type of equipment; the defendant acquired in good
faith without knowledge of any infirmity in the title; the an-
tecedent debt of the consignee served as valuable consideration;
and the plaintiff apparently clothed the consignee with the neces-
sary indicia of ownership to allow the consignee to pass a valid
title to defendant. 7 In reversing, the Court of Appeal for the
Fourth Circuit met the issue precisely and held that since de-
fendant did not pay cash for the merchandise, but only gave
credit, valuable consideration was lacking, and the defendant
could not be considered a bona fide purchaser against the true
owner of the property. ' In affirming the decision, the Supreme
Court stated the court of appeal properly held that satisfaction
of an antecedent debt was not value within the meaning of the
bona fide purchaser rule. However, in stating the rule, the
Supreme Court added the requirement that in order to be a bona
fide purchaser for value the party giving value must be in cir-
cumstances such that he cannot be restored to his original posi-
tion.19 The court further stated that under the provisions of
the Louisiana Civil Code 20 the consignee would have discharged
his obligation if the goods delivered had been of the kind con-
17. See note 6 supra.
18. Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Epstein, 159 So. 2d 1, 2 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963) : "Since Al Epstein, Inc. did not pay cash for Plaintiff's merchandise
entrusted for sale to Zapetis [consignee], but received it as a dation en paiement
to satisfy a pre-existing debt, Al Epstein, Inc. cannot be considered as a bona
fide purchaser as against the true owner, Plaintiff."
19. 246 La. 953, 959, 169 So. 2d 61, 63 (1964), quoting from 24 AM. & ENG.
]ENcyc. 1171, 1173, the Supreme Court stated: " 'To constitute a bona fide pur-
chaser he must have been a purchaser for value; that is he must have parted
with value at the time of his purchase or before notice of the adverse interest
sought to be enforced against him, so that in case he is deprived of the property
he cannot be placed in the position he was in prior to the purchase.'"
20. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2138 (1870).
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sumed in use and the creditor had in fact used them. The court
disposed of the defendant's argument that the equipment having
been sold in a subsequent transaction, had been consumed in
use within the meaning of article 2138, by stating that selling
a thing is not synomymous with consuming it.21
The majority view at common law is that credit on a pre-
existing debt is not value; after the true owner has been allowed
to recover his property, the parties can be placed in their original
positions without prejudice by a reinstatement of the debt.22 This
view was adopted in the instant case.2 3 It is submitted, however,
that reinstatement of the debt may not always re-establish the
status quo. If, for example, the debtor has become insolvent,
restoring the debt would leave the creditor in a worse position.
Furthermore, the creditor may, in reliance on delivery of the
goods and crediting of the debt, enter into transactions he might
not otherwise have undertaken, thus further worsening his posi-
tion.
The minority of common law jurisdictions take the position
that there seems little basis for distinguishing between money
and credit on debt in defining value. This view may be sup-
ported by several reasons. First, if the defendant had actually
paid cash and the consignee had converted the money to his
own use, defendant would have been a bona fide purchaser for
value under the existing rule. Going a step further, if the
consignee used this cash to discharge his debt to the defendant
and the latter accepted the funds in good faith,24 there seems
little reason for saying that the defendant would not be a bona
fide purchaser for value, and the plaintiff-owner would have
to look to his consignee for payment. Second, the Negotiable
Instruments Law recognizes credit on a pre-existing debt as suf-
ficient to make one a holder in due course, 25 and this rule has
21. 246 La. 953, 962, 169 So. 2d 61, 64 (1964) : "On its face the article does
not admit of the interpretation that selling is included in the meaning of the
word 'consumed', for it is treating of 'those things consumed in the use, and the
creditor has used them.' There is no basis whatever for saying that using a thing,
and by such use consuming it, includes or is synonymous with selling it."
22. See VOLD, SALES 403 (2d ed. 1959).
23. 246 La. 953, 962, 169 So., 2d 61, 64 (1964): "Thus when the plaintiff
recovers from Epstein [defendant], Epstein will be in the same position it was
in before receiving the gears from Zapetis [consignee]."
24. Good faith as used here is intended to mean that the defendant does not
have notice or knowledge that the money being paid to him is the same used by
him to purchase the gears.
25. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 25 (7th ed. 1948).
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been followed in Louisiana.26 Third, if the principle "that where
one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss, he who is the
cause or occasion of that loss ought to bear it '' 27 is applied to
the instant case, the loss should fall on the plaintiff since he had
chosen the consignee whose wrongful act caused the harm.
Fourth, treating credit on a pre-existing debt as value would
not only provide greater protection for transactions,2 8 but would
also recognize that credit has become a universal method of
conducting business.29
While the decision brings Louisiana in line with the majority
of common law jurisdictions, there is a more desirable basis for
allowing the plaintiff to recover his goods. It is submitted
that article 2138 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides adequate
authority for allowing recovery by the consignor because this
article expressly provides that a debtor may not discharge his
obligation by giving a thing which he has no right to deliver.
However, application of article 2138 raises several problems.
A similar provision in the French Civil Code states that in
order to have a valid dation en paiement it is necessary that
the debtor be the owner of the thing and be capable of alienating
it. The test in French law, therefore, is "ownership" rather
than the "right to deliver it." The question arises whether the
redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code intended to permit a debtor
26. See Priest v. Wenzel, 168 La. 679, 123 So. 121 (1929) ; Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Longino, 168 La. 824, 123 So. 587 (1929); see also East Birmingham
Land Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565, 567, 5 So. 317, 318 (1889), wherein the court
stated: "The rule is well settled that a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable bill,
b6id, or note, although he buys from a thief, acquires a good title, if he pays
value for it, without notice of :the infirmity of his vendor's title."
27. Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 179, 96 So. 2d 477, 480 (1957). In
William Conner v. Hill, 6 La. Ann. 7 (1851), plaintiff entrusted certain goods
to his son and the latter left Allen in charge of the goods. Allen sold them to
defendant and plaintiff sought recovery. In holding plaintiff estopped to recover
from defendant the court said: "It imposes upon shippers of produce for sale,
the necessity of selecting with great care, honest and capable men to intrust with
their property." Id. at 8.
28. See Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchaser, 6 TUL. L. REv. 589 (1931). In comparing
the French doctrine of la possession vaut titre and the Anglo-American concept
of bona fide purchaser also adopted in Louisiana, the author concludes that the
"Anglo-American system gives insufficient protection to transactions in movables,
excessive protection to transactions in immovables; and that the French system
quite adequately protects transactions in movables, and controls dealings in im-
movables by other devices." Id. at 595.
29. Long v. McAvoy, 133 Wash. 472, 480, 233 Pac. 930, 933 (1925) : "To
hold here that a transfer of property in payment of a pre-existing debt does not
make the purchaser one for value would bring great confusion to our cases ....
[Tihe most logical rule which will more nearly lend itself to business interests
[is] that one who purchases personal property of any character, paying therefor
by discharging a pre-existing debt, is a purchaser for value."
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to discharge his obligation by delivering a thing which he did
not own simply because he had the right to deliver it. In French
law, a consignee may validly discharge his debt by delivering
the thing held on consignment under the doctrine that posses-
sion of movables is equivalent to title. This is not true in Loui-
siana. It might be argued that the redactors did not adopt the
"ownership" test because it might operate too harshly but prefer-
red to extend the debtor's right to discharge his obligation by
allowing him to give in payment property over which he had
the right of delivery. Assuming the redactors intended to adopt
this view, the question arises: what constitutes a "right to de-
liver." A literal interpretation of a "right to deliver" in the
instant case might cause the following results: Since a dation
en paiement is treated as a type of sale by the Louisiana Civil
Code,30 and since a consignee for purposes of sale would have
a right to deliver the thing for a dation, it could be contended
that as the consignee in the instant case had a right to deliver
the thing by way of sale, he had a right to deliver by way of
dation en paiement. It is doubtful that the redactors of the
Louisiana Civil Code intended such an interpretation. It would
be logical to limit the "right to deliver" to transactions by way
of sale or possibly by way of dation en paiement for the owner's
debt. This view may be supported by interpreting the words
"no right to deliver" as meaning "no right to deliver by way of
giving in payment." The Supreme Court apparently adopted
this approach when it stated that a debtor cannot extinguish his
obligation by giving in payment a thing which he does not own.8 1
In conclusion, it is submitted that the final result reached by
the Supreme Court seems desirable in light of the Code provisions
and that subsequent cases of this nature should be disposed of
similarly, if possible. However, to say that credit on pre-existing
debt is not value within the bona fide purchaser rule appears to
be desirable only where the third party who accepts the goods by
way of a dation en p aiement has not, in fact, injuriously relied
on the delivery. To so limit the decision would provide a flexible
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2656 (1870) : "That giving in payment differs from
the ordinary contract of sale is this, that the latter is perfect by the mere consent
of the parties, even before delivery, while the giving in payment is made only by
delivery."
31. 246 La. 953, 962, 169 So. 2d 61, 63 (1964): "The article [2138] was
evidently quoted for the legal principle that a debtor cannot extinguish his obliga-
tion by giving in payment to his creditor property which he does not own, and
that the true owner has the right to pursue the creditor who has wrongfully been
paid with his property."
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rule, protecting the owner if the parties could actually be placed
in their original positions, or the creditor, if, through no fault of
his own, he could not be restored to his original position. This
approach would also give effect to the additional requirement of
the bona fide purchaser rule stated by the Supreme Court 2 which,
it is submitted, should be limited to cases involving a giving in
payment.8
8
Robert A. Seale, Jr.
TORTS - THE EMERGENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY IN
PRODUCTS CASES
Today a consumer is apt to select an item because of the
glowing descriptions of a television commercial, or because of
enticing packages and displays.' Courts are aware that, with
the advent of mass advertising through radio, television, maga-
zines, and billboards, consumers purchase specialized products
manufactured miles away from the retail outlet by processes
only experts understand 2 and that, consequently, only manu-
facturers, and not the ultimate consumers, are able to evaluate
the worth, quality, and fitness of the products. 3 As a result,
manufacturers are being held to a greater degree of care to the
end that their products fulfill their representations and are free
from harmful defects.
4
Traditionally, the two theories, warranty-contract and negli-
gence-tort, that were available to a person injured by a defec-
tive product, equally required the person to be in privity with
the manufacturer. The origin of the privity requirement is un-
certain ;5 it is clear, however, that growth in the area of prod-
ucts liability has been marked by the gradual elimination of the
32. See note 19 supra.
33. The following example will illustrate the need for this limitation. If a
third party in good faith and without notice of any infirmity in the title of goods
pays cash for them, he is undoubtedly a bona fide purchaser for value. If the
rule required that this party be placed in a worse position before being protected
as a bona fide purchaser for value, this would clearly be contra the established
rule. See note 1 supra.
1. See Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961).
2. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
3. See Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612 (1958).
4. Witherspoon, Do You Have A Products Liability Case?, 36 Miss. L.J. 30,
33 (1964).
5. See Comment, 27 Mo. L. REv. 193 (1962).
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